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I. Introduction 
In the film Groundhog Day,1 Bill Murray awakens on the 
morning of the titular holiday to find himself forced to relive the 
same day repeatedly. For Ted Wells, a veteran attorney who 
defended Big Tobacco in the late 1990s, it may have felt like 
Groundhog Day when Big Oil came calling with a similar problem.2 
The downfall of Big Tobacco came at the hands of a cache of 
industry internal documents, painstakingly revealed over decades 
of litigation.3 These documents exposed a coordinated campaign of 
disinformation aimed at clouding the scientific consensus that 
smoking was harmful.4  
Now, only a few years later, ExxonMobil finds themselves 
under the same scrutiny. Only this time, something is different. 
Leading the charge is New York Attorney General Eric 
Schneiderman, who comes armed with a new investigative tool, the 
Martin Act. This 1920s-era law, designed to combat securities 
fraud, gives Schneiderman the power to subpoena mass amounts 
of documents justified only by an ounce of suspicion.5 Thus, rather 
                                                                                                     
 1. GROUNDHOG DAY (Columbia Pictures 1993).  
 2. See Paul Barrett & Matthew Philips, Can ExxonMobil be Found Liable 
for Misleading the Public on Climate Change?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 
7, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-07/will-
exxonmobil-have-to-pay-for-misleading-the-public-on-climate-change (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2017) (noting that Ted Wells was leading the defense team for 
Exxon, having previously defended Philip Morris) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 3. See infra Part II.B (detailing the history of tobacco litigation and the 
development of tactics to expose internal documents). 
 4. See infra Part II.B.3 (explaining the misconduct exposed by internal 
documents from the tobacco industry, which ultimately lead to judgment against 
the companies under RICO).  
 5. See infra Part II.A.1 (setting out the powers of the New York Attorney 
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than takings years of painstaking discovery as it did against Big 
Tobacco, the coffers of ExxonMobil’s internal documents could be 
opened instantly.6 Expectedly, outcries of criticism rang out, and 
soon allegations of collusion, misconduct, and bad faith intent 
rained down on Eric Schneiderman and his “activist” attorney 
general colleagues.7  
This Note examines the complexities of the ExxonMobil 
investigations, seeking to understand how the investigation 
unfolded over time and its motivating factors.8 To properly 
understand the investigation, one must understand the basis of the 
attorney general’s powers and assess whether those powers are 
being used improperly. Further, this note seeks to survey the 
potential consequences of action taken to curb Eric 
Schneiderman’s aggressive tactics.9 Ultimately, this Note argues 
that, despite potential risks, the unique circumstances of the 
ExxonMobil investigation—combined with the rapidly changing 
political landscape—indicate that moving forward with the 
investigation is Eric Schneiderman’s ideal course of conduct. 
Part II of this Note outlines the development, mechanics, and 
past uses of both the Martin Act and tobacco litigation tactics by 
“activist” attorneys general.10 Part III traces the origins of the 
ExxonMobil investigation, and discusses the convergence of the 
Martin Act and tobacco litigation tactics, along with the fallout 
from Exxon’s counter-allegations of misconduct.11 Part IV assess 
the potential consequences if critics of the Exxon investigation 
attempt to reign in Eric Schneiderman’s conduct back to the 
                                                                                                     
General under the Martin Act).  
 6. See infra Part II.B.2 (reviewing previous uses of the Martin Act to force 
companies to open their internal documents to inspection by the attorney 
general’s office).    
 7. See infra Part III.C. (covering the fervent criticisms of Eric 
Schneiderman’s decision to commission an investigation into ExxonMobil under 
the Martin Act, as well as his alleged ties to environmental activists).  
 8. See infra Part III.A (tracing the origins of the ExxonMobil investigation 
and the conception of using attorney general subpoena power to gain access to 
internal documents).  
 9. See infra Part IV (examining the risks Eric Schneiderman faces if he 
continues to push his investigation forward despite criticisms and allegations of 
misconduct). 
 10. Infra Part II. 
 11. Infra Part III. 
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boundaries of acceptable attorney general activism.12 Finally, Part 
V establishes the framework under which Eric Schneiderman’s 
conduct can be justified, and argues that the his best course of 
conduct is to continue forward, despite any consequences.13 
II. The Development of Attorney General Activism: A Case Study 
of Two Tactics 
State attorneys general have a long history of taking an 
activist stance toward issues of national policy and working 
cooperatively to address these issues. Past examples include 
litigation in antitrust14, consumer protection,15  and environmental 
law.16 While some are critical of this “attorney general activism,”17 
these attorneys general have gone more-or-less unchecked and 
continue to engage in these tactics. But this raises questions as to 
whether boundaries of acceptable “attorney general activism” 
exist, and what the fallout might be if those boundaries are 
crossed. For instance, are there limits on the extent attorneys 
general may collaborate and form coalitions? Is it acceptable to 
combine multiple “tools” or “tactics” for more efficient activism?  
These are some of the questions surrounding Eric 
Schneiderman’s investigation into ExxonMobil under the Martin 
Act and its alleged tie to tobacco litigation tactics. Consequently, 
                                                                                                     
 12. Infra Part IV. 
 13. Infra Part V. 
 14. See Jason Lynch, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State 
Attorneys General in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1998, 2003–08 
(2001) (detailing the rise of attorney general cooperation in multistate litigation).  
 15. See id. at 2007 (citing as an example a 1999 multistate action brought by 
twenty-seven states against Publisher’s Clearing House for deceptive trade 
practices in advertising).  
 16. See Lawrence G. Wasden & Brian Kane, Massachusetts v. EPA: A 
Strategic and Jurisdictional Recipe for State Attorneys General in the Context of 
Emission Accelerated Global Warming Solutions, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 703, 713 (2008) 
(examining attorney general potential strategies in the wake of the states and 
environmentalists’ victory in Massachusetts v. EPA).  
 17. See Michael DeBow, Restraining State Attorneys General, Curbing 
Government Lawsuit Abuse, 437 POLICY ANALYSIS,  May, 2002, at 1 (arguing that 
attorneys general engage in “lawsuit abuse” which breaches the separation of 
powers in state government) https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/ 
pubs/pdf/pa437.pdf.  
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understanding the development and mechanics of the Martin Act 
and tobacco litigation tactics as tools for attorneys general is 
crucial to exploring their roles as potential catalysts for violating 
boundaries of acceptable attorneys general activism. 
A. State Blue Sky Laws and New York’s Martin Act 
Every state has adopted some form of securities law, often 
referred to as “Blue Sky laws,”18 which are generally modeled on 
the Uniform Securities Act.19 These laws provide for the 
administration of a regulatory scheme by an established group of 
commissioners.  
1. The Attorney General’s Powers Under the Martin Act 
New York’s regulatory framework, established under the 
Martin Act,20 differs significantly from most state and federal 
schemes in that it gives “vast investigatory and enforcement 
powers” to the Attorney General.21 Indeed, the Martin Act is often 
characterized as the most powerful securities law in the country.22 
Specifically, the Martin Act empowers the attorney general to 
investigate and prosecute any suspected securities fraud or 
deceitful practices.23 Much of this power stems from New York 
Court’s broad interpretation of “fraud” to include any “acts tending 
                                                                                                     
 18. See Blue Sky Laws, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/answers/bluesky.htm (last updated Oct. 14, 2014) (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2017) (providing a brief definition of Blue Sky laws) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 19. UNIF. SEC. ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
 20. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352(1) (McKinney 2013). 
 21. NINA HART, LEGAL TOOLS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE ADVOCACY: SECURITIES 
LAW 10 (2015), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/ 
climate-change/ adaptationhandbook_securitieslaw.pdf. 
 22. See Nina Hart, Moving at a Glacial Pace: What Can State Attorneys Do 
About SEC Inattention to Nondisclosure of Financially Material Risks Arising 
From Climate Change?, 40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 99, 107 (2015) (pointing to the 
Martin Act’s broad definition of fraud as a reason for this characterization).  
 23. See People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33, 38–9 (1926) 
(construing the Martin Act to condemn “all deceitful practices contrary to the 
plain rules of common honesty”).  
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to deceive or mislead the public,” regardless of a showing of intent 
or scienter.24 Moreover, the attorney general may investigate any 
suspected wrongdoing that an entity “shall have employed, or 
employs, or is about to employ.”25 Thus, actual proof of such 
fraudulent conduct or wrongdoing is not necessary to commence an 
investigation.26 This broad discretionary power is further bolstered 
by the plenary power of attorney general discretion, making 
decisions of whether to investigate an entity not reviewable.27 
The attorney general’s powers under the Martin Act are not 
limited, however, to discretion in undertaking an investigation. 
Once an investigation commences, the attorney general may issue 
subpoenas for testimony, documents, and any other information 
relevant or material to the investigation.28 An individual’s failure 
to comply with these requests “without reasonable cause” results 
in a misdemeanor.29 Because the state’s request for information is 
investigatory in nature, witnesses subpoenaed for testimony are 
not given the right to counsel or a right against self-
incrimination.30 Additionally, while in most cases counsel may be 
present, they are barred from objecting to questions, taking notes, 
and receiving a transcript of the testimony.31 The entire process 
may be carried on as a completely private matter, barring 
                                                                                                     
 24. People v. Cadplaz Sponsors, 69 Misc. 2d 417, 419 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) 
(enjoining a building developer from using an information bulletin containing 
inaccurate information to solicit investors for a building project).  
 25. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352(1) (McKinney 2013). 
 26. See ANDREW LORIN, THE INVESTMENT PROTECTION BUREAU: AN OVERVIEW 
OF FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT IN NEW YORK 5 (2006), 
http://policydialogue.org/files/events/Lorin_investment_protection_bureu_1.pdf 
(explaining that Martin Act proceedings differ from private litigation because no 
proof of reasonable reliance or damages is required).  
 27. See People v. Bunge Corp., 250 N.E.2d 204, 206 (N.Y. 1969) (“We cannot 
agree that the Legislature intended to grant the courts the authority to judicially 
review the Attorney-General’s exercise of discretion in dealing with a Martin Act 
violation.”). 
 28. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352(1) (McKinney 2013). 
 29. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352(4) (McKinney 2013). 
 30. See Lorin, supra note 26, at 8 (noting that attorneys are often surprised 
to learn that because these proceedings are not adjudicative in nature, their client 
does not have a right to counsel).  
 31. See id. at 9 (clarifying that testimony transcripts are only available once 
the Attorney General’s investigation is complete and require a request under New 
York’s Freedom of Information Law).  
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disclosure by any witness or state official at risk of a 
misdemeanor.32 
The attorney general may also conduct a public Martin Act 
investigation.33 To proceed publicly, the Attorney General seeks an 
order from the New York Supreme Court directing witnesses to 
appear before the court or produce any information requested.34 
The order may include an injunction to preserve the status quo 
while the investigation proceeds if the court finds it proper or 
expedient.35 Further, the attorney general may continue to 
subpoena persons privately while a public investigation is active.36 
The potential reputational and business damage of a public 
criminal investigation makes the public Martin Act investigation 
a powerful leverage tool for the attorney general, with significant 
“shock value.”37  
Additionally, while investigatory powers already incentivize 
cooperation by investigation targets, these actors are further 
incentivized by the risk that noncompliance could lead the attorney 
general to institute a civil action against them.38  Civil actions 
under the Martin Act carry additional consequences for 
defendants, such as enjoinment by the attorney general if the 
defendant is believed to be engaged in or is about to engage in any 
                                                                                                     
 32. See Frank C. Razzano, The Martin Act: An Overview, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. 
L. 125, 128 (2006) (remarking that disclosure may be proper if given permission 
by the Attorney General).  
 33. See id. (separating coverage of the Act’s investigative powers into public 
and private investigations). 
 34. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 354, 355 (McKinney 2013). 
 35. See Abrams v. Long Beach Oceanfront Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 518 N.Y.S.2d 
323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (denying a motion to vacate a Martin Act order and 
injunction); see also Robert G. Morvillo & Robert J. Anello, White Collar Crime: 
Securities, Investigations and Prosecutions Under the Martin Act, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 
31, 2003), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=900005383709/WhiteCollar-
Crime?%20&slreturn=20170010071551 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (citing an 
investigation by then-Attorney General Elliot Spitzer that obtained an injunction 
against a brokerage firm) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 36. See Lorin, supra note 26, at 9 (pointing out that persons or entities not 
named as respondents in the public § 354 proceedings may still be subpoenaed 
privately). 
 37. See Morvillo & Anello, supra note 35 (describing the Martin Act public 
investigation as giving the Attorney General “awesome power”).  
 38. See Razzano, supra note 32 at 131 (detailing the increased powers 
available to the attorney general once a civil action has been commenced). 
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practice declared to be fraudulent.39 Particularly, if the application 
for a permanent injunction shows that the defendant has refused 
“to answer a material question” or “to produce a book or paper 
relevant to the inquiry” when ordered by the attorney general, 
“such refusal shall be prima facie proof that such defendant is or 
has been engaged in fraudulent practices . . . .”40 This potential 
exposure greatly incentivizes any subject of a Martin Act 
investigation to dutifully comply. 
2. The Expansion of the Martin Act’s Role as a Tool of Activist 
Enforcement 
Originally passed in 1921, the Martin Act remained 
underutilized for much of its early life.41 It was not until Elliot 
Spitzer took office in 1999 that the attorney general’s office began 
to use the Martin Act to aggressively investigate corporations.42 
During his time in office, Spitzer pursued multiple Martin Act 
investigations aimed at combatting fraud on Wall Street and 
targeting the banking, hedge fund, and mutual fund industries.43 
These investigations proved successful as he obtained large 
settlements against several large financial institutions such as 
Merrill Lynch.44 With the door of the Martin Act now ajar, Spitzer’s 
                                                                                                     
 39. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 353 (McKinney 2013). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Hart, supra note 21 at 107 (noting that early use of the Martin Act 
was reserved for “uranium boiler rooms and promoters of shady Canadian mining 
stock” (quoting Nicholas Thompson, The Sword of Spitzer, LEGAL AFF. (May/June 
2004), http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-2004/feature_thompson_ 
mayjun04.msp (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review))). 
 42. See Morvillo & Anello, supra note 35 (“Among the recent high-profile 
uses of the Martin Act are Attorney General Spitzer’s investigation into whether 
stock analysts were operating under conflicts of interest when they issued reports 
on companies that were also clients of their firm’s investment banking 
business . . . .”).  
 43. See Sarah Kelly-Kilgore, Ninety and Kicking? How New York’s Martin 
Act is Only Getting Stronger with Age, AM. CRIM. L. REV. (Feb. 2, 2011), 
http://www.americancriminallawreview.com/aclr-online/ninety-and-kicking-how-
new-yorks-martin-act-only-getting-stronger-age/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) 
(elaborating on the expanded use of the Martin Act under Attorney General 
Spitzer) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 44. See Hart, supra note 41, at 107 (remarking that prior to Spitzer taking 
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successor, Andrew Cuomo, continued to undertake investigations 
into the financial sector.45 
In 2007, Attorney General Cuomo commenced an 
unprecedented expansion of aggressive Martin Act use into a new 
arena: energy.46 That fall, Cuomo issued Martin Act subpoenas to 
five energy companies to determine whether these companies had 
failed to include material information in their SEC disclosures 
regarding risks related to climate change.47 The subpoenas sought 
information regarding each companies’ “analyses of [their] climate 
risks and disclosures of such risks to investors.”48 These 
investigations coincided with Cuomo joining a group of investors 
and environmental groups to petition the SEC for interpretive 
guidance on information disclosures regarding financial risks 
associated with climate change.49 Seeking clarification under 
existing law, the petition expressed concern that there may be 
                                                                                                     
office, it was an unspoken rule that the Martin Act would not be used against 
Wall Street (citing Nicholas Thompson, The Sword of Spitzer, LEGAL AFF. 
(May/June 2004), http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-
2004/feature_thompson_mayjun04.msp (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review))).  
 45. See Kate Kelly, Amir Efrati & Ruth Simon, State Subprime Probe Takes 
a New Tack, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2008, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB120173938230430417 (last updated Jan. 31, 
2008) (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (reporting on investigations by Andrew Cuomo 
into the subprime mortgage crisis) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 46. See Hart, supra note 41, at 131 (citing examples of Attorney General 
Cuomo’s willingness to be an active participant in initiatives related to climate 
change and the environment). 
 47. See Felicity Barringer & Danny Hakim, New York Subpoenas 5 Energy 
Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/09/16/nyregion/16greenhouse.html?_r=0 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (quoting 
notices of the investigation sent to the companies as stating “[s]elective disclosure 
of favorable information or omission of unfavorable information concerning 
climate change is misleading”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 48. See Hart, supra note 41, at 106 (quoting Letter from N.Y. Office of Att’y 
Gen. to Paul Hanrahan, President and CEO, AES Corp. Accompanying Subpoena 
(Sept. 14, 2007), http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/press-
releases/archived/aes%20corporation.pdf).  
 49. PETITION FOR INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE, File 
No. 4-547 (Sept. 18, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-
547.pdf. 
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widespread nondisclosure of material information relating to 
climate change.50  
The posture of Cuomo’s investigations is important for a 
number of reasons. For one, each of the companies complied with 
the investigations, presumably because of the Martin Act’s 
penalties for noncompliance.51 After investigating the companies’ 
internal documents, the investigations ended with a settlement 
agreement in which the company agreed to correct their SEC 
disclosures and filing practices to account for climate change 
information.52  Finally, Cuomo’s motive was more-or-less 
straightforward—a concern with the extent of climate information 
disclosures under SEC guideline—as the tandem petition for 
guidance from the SEC shows.53 This at least shows a semblance 
of the attorney general’s office willingness to work in concert with 
the federal government.54 The characteristics that define Cuomo’s 
investigations sketch a rough baseline of previously acceptable use 
of the Martin Act in a climate context. Furthermore, this baseline 
is a useful measuring stick when considering characterizations of 
Eric Schneiderman’s later investigations as aggressive55 and the 
product of ulterior motives, such as pursuing tobacco style 
litigation tactics.56 
                                                                                                     
 50. See Hart supra note 41, at 104 (noting that the petition identified 
growing awareness of financial risks posed by climate change, and potential 
violations of selective disclosure law). 
 51. See supra notes 20–40 and accompanying text (discussing the potential 
consequences of noncompliance with a Martin Act investigation).  
 52. See Informing Investors of Climate Risk: the Impact of Securities Law in 
the Environmental Context, 46 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10455, 10459–62 
(2016) [hereinafter Informing Investors of Climate Risk] (summarizing each of the 
settlement agreements and commenting on Cuomo’s actions). 
 53. See Hart, supra note 37, at 105–11 (explaining the interrelated timeline 
of Cuomo’s Martin Act investigations and petitions to the SEC). 
 54. See Informing Investors of Climate Risk, supra note 52, at 10459 
(commenting that the settlement agreements were focused solely on the adequacy 
of disclosures in the SEC context).  
 55. See id. at 10460 (noting that a settlement brokered by Eric 
Schneiderman against a coal company differed from Cuomo’s because it included 
much more detailed public findings and actual allegations of violations of the 
Martin Act). 
 56. See Brendan Nyhan, The Limits of the ‘Tobacco Strategy’ on Climate 
Change, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/07/ 
upshot/the-limits-of-the-tobacco-strategy-on-climate-change.html (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2017) (assessing the parallels and differences between Eric 
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B. History of U.S. Tobacco Litigation and Plaintiff’s Tactics 
1. Early Tobacco Litigation 
In the mid-1950s, two research groups published scientific 
studies that presented strong evidence linking cigarette smoking 
to health hazards.57 With the publication of this evidence, a 
grueling six-decade-long battle against tobacco companies began.58 
Responding to these studies, the tobacco industry began to 
implement a “sophisticated disinformation campaign designed to 
deceive the public about hazards of smoking,”59 while also 
conceiving litigation tactics to protect themselves in the courts.60 
The defensive tactics focused heavily on burdening plaintiff’s 
counsel through delay and evasiveness, while also driving up 
litigation costs for plaintiff’s counsel.61 Tobacco companies 
achieved much of this delay and obfuscation through resisting all 
discovery attempts, which lead to extensive battles over motions, 
court hearings, and protective orders.62 
For much of the history of tobacco litigation, the tactics proved 
to be fruitful and plaintiffs saw little success.63 The first “wave” of 
                                                                                                     
Schneiderman’s investigation into Exxon Mobil and strategies previously used by 
tobacco opponents) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 57. See generally E.L. Wynder & E.A. Graham, Experimental Production of 
Carcinoma with Cigarette Tar, 13 CANCER RES. 855 (1953); R. Doll & A.B. Hill, A 
Study of Aetiology of Carcinoma of the Lung, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 1271 (1952). 
 58. See Michael V. Ciresi, Roberta B. Walburn & Tara D. Sutton, Decades of 
Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minnesota Tobacco Litigation, 25 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 477, 482 (1999) (tracing the beginnings of tobacco litigation 
back to the 1950s). 
 59. SETH SHULMAN, CLIMATE ACCOUNTABILITY INST., ESTABLISHING 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGES: LESSONS FROM TOBACCO 
CONTROL 5, 8 (2012), http://www.climateaccountability.org/pdf/ 
Climate%20Accountability%20Rpt%20Oct12.pdf [hereinafter SHULMAN, 
ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY]. 
 60. See Ciresi, Walburn, & Sutton, supra note 58, at 480–82 (1999) 
(providing in depth discussion of the history of tobacco litigation and tactics).  
 61. See id. at 481–82 (listing examples of delaying tactics, such as excessive 
depositions and bombarding plaintiff’s counsel with massive amounts of useless 
information). 
 62. See id. (remarking that even when discovery proceeded, tobacco company 
counsel would pursue confidentiality orders to shield their disclosures).  
 63. See Arthur B. LeFrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors, and Public 
Policy, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 187, 190 (2000) (“From 1954 to 1994, a period of forty 
years, approximately 813 claims were filed by private citizens in tort actions in 
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litigation against tobacco companies consisted mostly of personal 
injury suits by individual smokers following the publication of 
scientific studies in the 1950s.64 Faced with the tobacco companies’ 
defensive tactics—most notably stunting access to internal 
documents—plaintiffs struggled to prove a causal linkage between 
smoking and lung cancer.65 The second “wave” of tobacco litigation 
began in the 1980s, which plaintiffs again brought as personal 
injury suits.66 These cases struggled to achieve victory as the 
tobacco industry shifted its collective argument to a “common 
knowledge defense,” asserting that smoking hazards were a known 
fact and smokers who continued smoking were engaged in 
“freedom of choice.”67  
Despite limited progress, the second era of cases did achieve 
one noteworthy victory in the discovery process.68 In Cipollone v. 
Liggett Group Inc.,69 the plaintiff succeeded on a pretrial motion 
compelling the tobacco industry to release “thousands of pages of 
confidential internal documents” that showed the existence of a 
conspiracy to “prevent the release of damaging information on the 
health hazards of cigarette smoking.”70 Although Cippollone and 
its companion case Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc.71 were eventually 
                                                                                                     
state court against tobacco companies. Only twice did courts find in favor of the 
plaintiff . . . .”). 
 64. See Ciresi, Walburn & Sutton, supra note 58, at 482–86 (detailing the 
results of early attempts to litigate against tobacco companies).  
 65. See id. (noting that in one such unsuccessful case, Latrigue v. R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963), access to R.J. Reynold’s 
internal documents, which contained acknowledgement by company scientists 
that data confirms a relationship between smoking and cancer, could have altered 
the verdict in the trial).  
 66. See id. at 485 (pointing out that this wave of cases arose in the wake of 
the surgeon general’s reports and the federally-mandated warning labels on 
cigarettes).  
 67. Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 853, 870 (1992).  
 68. See Ciresi, Walburn & Sutton, supra note 58, at 486–87 (“These 
documents offered the first glimpse of the treasures that would be found in the 
industry’s files.”). 
 69. 683 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1998).  
 70. Christine Hatfield, The Privilege Doctrines—Are They Just Another 
Discovery Tool Utilized by the Tobacco Industry to Conceal Damaging 
Information?, 16 PACE L. REV. 525, 565 (1996).  
 71. 140 F.R.D. 681 (D.N.J. 1992). 
SMOKE ’EM IF YOU GOT ’EM 349 
vacated on appeal,72 they served as the “first indications of the 
extent of the role of tobacco company lawyers in shielding 
documents from discovery on improper claims of privilege.”73 This 
small discovery victory would prove to be influential on tactics 
attorneys employed against the tobacco industry in later cases.74 
2. Changing Strategy in Recent Tobacco Litigation 
In 1994, new information regarding the tobacco industry’s 
conduct came to light through hearings before the U.S. House of 
Representatives and disclosures from the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration.75 Additionally, Merrell Williams, a paralegal for a 
firm representing tobacco company Brown & Williamson, publicly 
leaked reams of the company’s internal documents.76 In light of 
these new findings, a third “wave” of litigation began.77 This string 
of cases, however, differed significantly from past litigation 
because it was not limited to individual claims; rather these cases 
included states “seeking wide-scale injunctive relief and to recover 
the costs to the state for medical care for injured smokers.”78 The 
State of Minnesota—joined by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
Minnesota and with Attorney General Hubert Humphrey’s 
backing—filed a complaint against the tobacco industry,79 alleging 
                                                                                                     
 72. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 92–94 (3d Cir. 1992), 
vacating 140 F.R.D. 681 (D.N.J. 1992) (finding that the District Court improperly 
exercised its reconsideration function under the Federal Magistrate Act when it 
considered evidence not originally before the magistrate judge).  
 73. Ciresi, Walburn & Sutton, supra note 58, at 487. 
 74. Infra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
 75. See Ciresi, Walburn & Sutton, supra note 58, at 488 (remarking that the 
hearings were chaired by U.S. Representative Henry Waxman).  
 76. See id. at 487 (elaborating on the extent of the conduct exposed by the 
“Merrell Williams Documents,” which showed manipulation of the scientific 
record and promotion of a controversy over the linkage between smoking and 
disease).  
 77. Supra notes 53–73 and accompanying text. 
 78. See Ciresi, Walburn & Sutton, supra note 58, at 487–88 (indicating that 
this third wave of litigation also included large class action suits on behalf of 
smokers).  
 79. See Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 491 (Minn. 1996) 
(listing Philip Morris Incorporated, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corporation, B.A.T. Industries P.L.C., Lorillard Tobacco 
Company, The American Tobacco Company, Liggett Group, Inc., the Council for 
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a “50-year long conspiracy to defraud America about the hazards 
of smoking, to stifle development of safer cigarettes, and to target 
children as new customers.”80  
Recognizing the tremendous value of internal industry 
documents, the Minnesota legal team focused their tactics from the 
start on using the legal discovery process to gain access to internal 
documents and bring them to public light.81 The battle to obtain 
these documents was unprecedented—the industry constantly 
fought disclosure, which forced Minnesota to bring countless 
motions to compel.82 Moreover, the industry undertook extensive 
efforts to hide documents from discovery, such as “listing them 
under different corporate entities, ‘laundering’ scientific 
documents by passing them through attorneys in order to claim 
attorney-client privilege, and playing word games in order to claim 
they didn’t have any documents on the topics sought by plaintiff.”83  
Minnesota’s arduous fight to pursue this strategy ultimately 
compelled the disclosure of some thirty-five million pages of 
internal industry documents.84 These documents were crucial to 
advancing Minnesota’s claims and helped shift the focus of 
litigation toward investigation into the industry’s conduct.85 After 
                                                                                                     
Tobacco Research, and the Tobacco Institute as defendants). 
 80. Minnesota Litigation and Settlement, PUB. HEALTH L. CTR. 
http://publichealthlawcenter.org/topics/tobacco-control/tobacco-control-
litigation/minnesota-litigation-and-settlement (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also e.g., Ciresi, Walburn & 
Sutton, supra note 58, at 487–88 (commenting that Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
of Minnesota “was the first private payer of health care costs to sue the industry”). 
 81. See SHULMAN, ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 59, at 8 
(explaining that Minnesota Attorney General Humphrey received criticism for 
emphasizing the importance of obtaining internal documents during the 
litigation).  
 82. See Ciresi, Walburn & Sutton, supra note 58, at 489–518 (detailing each 
distinct battle between Minnesota and the cigarette industry through the 
discovery process in Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 
1996)). 
 83. See SHULMAN, ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 59, at 8 (citing 
a statement by one of the key litigators in Humphrey, Roberta Walburn, that 
during pre-trial discovery, Philip Morris was spending around $1.2 million every 
week in legal defense).  
 84. See Ciresi, Walburn & Sutton, supra note 58, at 489 (observing that prior 
to the Minnesota litigation, only several million documents had been produced 
industry wide, almost all after 1981).  
 85. See SHULMAN, ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 59, at 8 (“As 
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a fifteen-week trial, the case settled before submission to the jury.86 
Perhaps even more importantly, the release of documents exposed 
the tobacco industry’s lies and deceitful practices to the public.87 
With the public perception of the tobacco industry shifting, these 
documents would become a crucial component of later actions 
against the tobacco industry. 
3. The Culmination of Tobacco Litigation: United States v. Philip 
Morris USA Inc. 
The release of documents in Humphrey v. Philip Morris, Inc.88 
opened a massive record of information which exposed the tobacco 
industry’s use of deceitful and manipulative practices over several 
decades.89 From these facts, litigators could lay an evidentiary 
foundation for charges of conspiracy or racketeering against the 
tobacco industry.90 The potential to assert these charges came to 
fruition in 1999, when the United States Department of Justice 
filed suit against several tobacco companies for fraudulent and 
unlawful conduct under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO).91 Relying heavily on the documents 
                                                                                                     
Roberta Walburn explained, their legal team was able to say to the judge and 
jury, ‘You don’t have to believe us or our experts; just look at the companies’ own 
words.”). 
 86. See Minnesota Litigation and Settlement, supra note 80 (remarking that 
the settlement still stands as the fourth largest legal settlement in history).   
 87. See SHULMAN, ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 59, at 9 
(recognizing that the information gleaned from the document release became 
front-page news). 
 88. 551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1996). 
 89. See SHULMAN, ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 59, at 9 
(“Formerly secret documents revealed that the heads of tobacco companies had 
colluded on a disinformation strategy as early as 1953.”).  
 90. See id. at 9 (acknowledging the importance of these potential charges in 
later tobacco litigation).  
 91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2012). See United States v. Philip Morris (DOJ 
Lawsuit), PUB. HEALTH L. CTR, http://publichealthlawcenter.org/topics/ tobacco-
control/tobacco-control-litigation/united-states-v-philip-morris-doj-lawsuit (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2017) (noting that the DOJ also sued for reimbursement of tobacco-
related medical expenses, however, these claims were dismissed) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO) was passed by Congress in 1970 with the intent of 
eradicating organized criminal activity and “preserve marketplace integrity by 
investigating, controlling, and prosecuting persons who participate or conspire to 
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obtained through the Minnesota litigation, the DOJ alleged that 
the tobacco companies had: 
engaged in a decades-long conspiracy to (1) mislead the public 
about the risks of smoking, (2) mislead the public about the 
danger of secondhand smoke; (3) misrepresent the 
addictiveness of nicotine, (4) manipulate the nicotine delivery of 
cigarettes, (5) deceptively market cigarettes characterized as 
“light” or “low tar,” while knowing that those cigarettes were at 
least as hazardous as full flavored cigarettes, (6) target the 
youth market; and (7) not produce safer cigarettes.92 
Following extensive litigation, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia issued a 1,683 page opinion finding Philip 
Morris and other tobacco companies guilty of violating RICO by 
fraudulently covering up the health risks associated with smoking 
and  marketing their products to children.93 The tobacco companies 
filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit; after review, however, the three-judge panel 
unanimously upheld the District Court’s decision.94 Reflecting on 
what is viewed as monumental victory for tobacco control, 
litigators involved in United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc. 
continue to note the importance that internal documents played in 
the outcome of the case, especially those obtained from the 
Minnesota litigation.95  
                                                                                                     
participate in racketeering.” Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). While generally associated with 
combatting organized criminal operations, the law applies broadly to any habitual 
criminal action that occurs in interstate commerce. See id. (citing to David R. 
McCormack’s explanation that two or more acts of racketeering shown in a 
complaint constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity necessary to attach 
liability under RICO).  
 92. Id. 
 93. See United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 499 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 
2006) (“As set forth in these Final Proposed Findings of Fact, substantial evidence 
establishes that Defendants have engaged in and executed—and continue to 
engage in and execute—a massive 50-year scheme to defraud the public, including 
consumers of cigarettes, in violation of RICO.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 566 
F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009), and order clarified, 778 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 94. See United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 
2009) (upholding the district court’s decision but vacating some of the additional 
remedies sought).  
 95. See SHULMAN, ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 59, at 9 
(referencing comments by Sharon Eubanks, one of the central litigator of the 
case).  
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Former tobacco litigators also recognize that obtaining these 
internal documents through discovery is a long and arduous 
process.96 As the litigation war against Big Tobacco continues, and 
activist litigators consider new targets, its unsurprising that these 
actors have considered ways to speed up the process.97 Just as state 
attorneys general played a breakthrough role in the fight against 
big tobacco, perhaps they could also play a role in “improving” 
tobacco tactics through their subpoena powers under statues like 
the Martin Act.98 
III. “Oil is the New Tobacco:” Tracing the Origins of the 
ExxonMobil Investigation 
In January 2007, the Union of Concerned Scientists published 
a sixty four page report documenting ExxonMobil’s alleged use of 
disinformation tactics—similar to those used by the tobacco 
industry—to mislead the public and create uncertainty 
surrounding the science of climate change.99 Only five months 
removed from the verdict in United States v. Philip Morris,100 the 
report made substantial comparisons between ExxonMobil and Big 
Tobacco, declaring that “ExxonMobil has underwritten the most 
                                                                                                     
 96. See Lincoln Caplan, Will the “Tobacco Strategy” Work Against Big Oil?, 
NEW YORKER (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/will-
the-tobacco-strategy-work-against-big-oil (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (pointing out 
that the grueling effort and time that has been invested into tobacco litigation, 
which is entering its seventh decade) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 97. See id. (commenting that a “fourth wave” of tobacco litigation has already 
begun, even though third wave tobacco litigation cases are still ongoing).  
 98. See Part III.A (discussing how tobacco litigators and climate activists 
conceived the idea of combining attorney general subpoena power with the 
tobacco litigation goal of exposing industry internal documents).  
 99. See SETH SHULMAN, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SMOKE, MIRRORS 
& HOT AIR: HOW EXXONMOBIL USES BIG TOBACCO’S TACTICS TO MANUFACTURE 
UNCERTAINTY ON CLIMATE SCIENCE 1–2 (2007), 
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/global_warmin
g/exxon_report.pdf [hereinafter SHULMAN, SMOKE, MIRRORS & HOT AIR] 
(identifying the Union of Concerned Scientists as a Massachusetts-based non-
profit focused on environmental health that “combines independent scientific 
research and citizen action to develop innovative, practical solutions and secure 
responsible changes in government policy, corporate practices, and consumer 
choices”). 
 100. 499 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006); supra Part II.C.2. 
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sophisticated and successful disinformation campaign since Big 
Tobacco misled the public about the incontrovertible scientific 
evidence linking smoking to lung cancer and heart disease.”101 
According to the report, ExxonMobil utilized its vast resources and 
government access to promote scientific uncertainty, shift political 
focus, and create doubt among the public.102 Specifically, the report 
cited Exxon’s funneling of $16 million between 1998 and 2005 to 
some forty think tanks and advocacy groups that raised doubts 
about the scientific consensus that carbon dioxide and other heat-
trapping emissions cause global warming.103 Despite the negative 
publicity that resulted from the report’s publication, any notion of 
pursuing the fossil fuel industry as the next tobacco remained 
mostly quiet.104 
A. Conceiving the Possibilities of Tobacco Tactics and 
Attorney General Powers 
In 2012, these notions became more than a mere possibility. 
In June 2012, scientists, academics, and lawyers descended on La 
Jolla, California, for a workshop hosted by the Union of Concerned 
Scientists together with the Climate Accountability Institute.105 
Titled “The Workshop on Climate Accountability, Public Opinion, 
and Legal Strategies” (“The La Jolla Conference”), the conference 
sought to “compare the evolution of public attitudes and legal 
strategies related to tobacco control with those related to 
anthropogenic climate change.”106 The workshop focused on 
assessing the question of holding private entities liable for the 
effects of climate change.107  
                                                                                                     
 101. SHULMAN, SMOKE, MIRRORS, & HOT AIR, supra note 99, at 3. 
 102. See id. at 1 (contending that ExxonMobil adopted the tobacco tactic of 
public supporting organizations which attempted to better understand climate 
science to “cover” its funding of organizations that seek to confuse understanding).  
 103. See id. at 3 (asserting that many of these organizations have an 
overlapping collection of staff, board members, and scientists).  
 104. See Barrett & Philips, supra note 2 (“The idea of ‘making oil the next 
tobacco’ percolated quietly for several years and reemerged in June 2012 . . . .”). 
 105. SHULMAN, ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 59, at 3 
(introducing the workshop generally before an in-depth discussion of its findings).  
 106. Id.  
 107. See id. (describing the general purpose for convening the La Jolla 
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The results of the workshop were twofold. First, the 
participants emphasized the importance of building a catalogue of 
peer-reviewed research on individual corporation’s contributions 
to climate change.108 This research would have present value in the 
ongoing battle of public opinion while having future value as part 
of the groundwork of liability in future legal action.109 Second, the 
attendees concluded that while there are multiple strategies for 
holding private entities liable, the key to altering public opinion 
and laying the groundwork for eventual legal victory was obtaining 
and publicizing internal corporate documents.110 Specifically, the 
participants recognized the breakthrough role internal documents 
played in tobacco litigation.111 Drawing parallels between the 
tobacco and fossil fuel industries, “many participants suggested 
that incriminating documents may exist that demonstrate 
collusion among the major fossil fuel companies, trade 
associations, and other industry sponsored groups.”112 Indeed, as 
one participant remarked “the tobacco fight is now the climate 
fight.” 113 
The La Jolla conference was not focused solely on assessing 
the potential of utilizing tobacco litigation strategies—it also 
sought to improve these strategies. Recognizing discovery is a 
lengthy process, lawyers present at the workshop emphasized 
                                                                                                     
Conference).  
 108. See Elana Schor & Andrew Restuccia, Exxon Scrambles to Contain 
Climate Crusade, POLITICO (May 9, 2016, 5:28 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/05/exxon-climate-campaign-222920 (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2017) (identifying the La Jolla Conference as the conceiving event 
of these tactics in a climate context) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).   
 109. See id. (quoting Center for International Environmental Law president 
Carroll Muffett as remarking that “[f]or a long time, fossil fuel companies have 
benefitted from the idea that everyone is responsible for climate change—and if 
everyone is responsible, then nobody is responsible”). 
 110. See SHULMAN, ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 59, at 11 
(listing a variety of legal strategies, such as filing lawsuits under public nuisance 
laws or claims of libel).  
 111. See id. at 7–10 (extensively discussing the development of tactics used to 
expose tobacco companies, the timeline these tactics generally follow, and the 
potential applicability of these tactics to climate change scenarios).  
 112. Id. at 9.  
 113. Id.  
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alternative avenues to gain access to internal documents.114 
Specifically, they noted that through a single sympathetic state 
attorney general and her subpoena powers, there was potential to 
gain significant access to documents.115 Despite the conference 
facilitating these discussions and findings, it would still be years 
before any major internal documents surfaced.116 
B. The Exposure of ExxonMobil 
These documents, however, did not surface from the work of a 
prosecutor or congressman, but rather from work of journalists. In 
September and October of 2015, InsideClimate News and the Los 
Angeles Times published reports (“the reports”) claiming that 
Exxon scientists had known about the implications of climate 
change and its environmental effects as far back as the 1970s, and 
further, that Exxon’s executives deliberately mislead the public 
about these findings.117 Citing internal company documents, the 
news organizations reported that despite company scientists 
making findings regarding climate science, top Exxon executives 
were publicly raising doubts about these same sorts of findings by 
                                                                                                     
 114. See id. at 11 (recognizing the potential of using congressional hearings 
as a means of obtaining access to internal documents).  
 115. See id. (“In addition, lawyers at the workshop noted that even grand 
juries convened by a district attorney could result in significant document 
discovery.”). 
 116. See Barrett & Philips, supra note 104 (reporting on the timeline leading 
up to ExxonMobil coming under scrutiny for climate change controversy).  
 117. See id. (noting that overlapping reports were released in the months 
immediately leading up to international climate talks in Paris); see also Neela 
Banerjee, Lisa Song & David Hasemyer, Exxon: The Road Not Taken, Part 1: 
Exxon’s Own Research Confirmed Fossil Fuels’ Role in Global Warming Decades 
Ago, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (Sept. 16, 2015), 
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/15092015/Exxons-own-research-confirmed-
fossil-fuels-role-in-global-warming (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (covering four 
decades of Exxon’s engagement with emerging climate science through internal 
company documents, interviews with former employees, and other primary 
sources) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Sara Jerving, Katie 
Jennings, Masako Melissa Hirsch & Susanne Rust, What Exxon Knew About 
Earth’s Melting Arctic, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), 
http://graphics.latimes.com/exxon-arctic/#about (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) 
(reporting on the gap ExxonMobil’s public position regarding climate change and 
its internal planning on issues of climate change) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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the 1990s.118 Additionally, the Los Angeles Times piece presented 
evidence that, throughout the 1990s, Exxon relied on climate 
change projections when it altered its Arctic exploration plans, 
while publicly undermining and denying such projections.119 
As expected, the reports “sparked waves of internet outrage, 
some mainstream media moralizing, and the Twitter hashtag 
#ExxonKnew.”120 Entering damage control mode, Exxon’s public-
relation’s staff began holding daily meetings to craft a response 
plan to contain the issue.121 Before Exxon could properly begin to 
respond, however, the momentum surrounding the controversy 
began picking up steam. On October 14, 2015, Democratic 
Representatives Ted Lieu and Mark DeSaulnier of California sent 
a letter to U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch requesting the 
Department of Justice investigate whether Exxon’s alleged 
misinformation practices had violated federal law.122 The situation 
was further amplified two weeks later, when 2016 Democratic 
presidential candidate Hilary Clinton voiced her support for a 
Justice Department investigation during a New Hampshire Town 
Hall.123 
                                                                                                     
 118. See Banerjee, Song & Hasemyer, supra note 117 (quoting then-CEO and 
Chairman of Exxon, Lee Raymond, arguing in 1997 against the Kyoto Protocols, 
which were created as a step toward curbing emissions). 
 119. See Jerving, Jennings, Hirsch & Rust, supra note 117 (interviewing 
former ExxonMobil scientists who studied the potential impact of climate change 
on infrastructure and business prospecting in the Arctic). 
 120. Barrett & Philips, supra note 104. 
 121. See id. (quoting one Exxon public affairs executive as remarking “We all 
sat around the table and said ‘This feels very orchestrated’ . . . .”). 
 122. See Reps Lieu, DeSaulnier Request Investigation Into Allegations of 
ExxonMobil Deception on Climate Change, OFFICE OF UNITED STATES 
REPRESENTATIVE TED LIEU (Oct. 16, 2015), https://lieu.house.gov/media-
center/press-releases/reps-lieu-desaulnier-request-investigation-allegations-
exxonmobil (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (remarking in the attached letter to U.S. 
Attorney General Loretta Lynch that the actions allegedly taken by Exxon 
resemble those used by Big Tobacco) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 123. See Timothy Cama, Hillary Joins Calls for Federal Probe of Exxon 
Climate Change Research, THE HILL (Oct. 29, 2015, 4:22 PM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/258589-clinton-joins-calls-for-
federal-probe-of-exxon (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (citing a quote from Hilary 
Clinton noting “[t]here’s a lot of evidence they [Exxon] misled people”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Shortly after Clinton’s comments, Exxon lobbyists descended 
on the congressional offices of House Democrats, including 
representative Lieu.124 During their visits, “[t]he lobbyists handed 
out a 10-page presentation titled Managing Climate Change 
Risks,” while conveying the message that Exxon “believes in 
climate change and that its being caused by humans, and we 
support a carbon tax.”125 Additionally, Exxon attempted to turn the 
tables on its accusers by alleging the company was the target of a 
politically motivated conspiracy.126 In a twist of irony, the company 
pointed to the Rockefeller family—the same Rockefeller family 
whose John D. Rockefeller founded Exxon forerunner Standard 
Oil—as the orchestrator of the alleged conspiracy.127 Pointing to 
funding the family’s charities provided to both the Los Angeles 
Times and InsideClimate, Exxon attacked the role of the 
Rockefellers in encouraging campaigns against it.128 While both 
journalistic organizations were quick to respond that their donors 
have no editorial control, Exxon and policy groups continued to 
attack the perceived conflict of interest.129 
Despite its attempts at damage control, the anti-Exxon sentiment 
surrounding the controversy only intensified. On October 30, forty 
environmental and social justice groups submitted a letter to 
Attorney General Lynch demanding a racketeering probe into 
Exxon’s alleged actions.130 Additionally, Representatives Lieu and 
                                                                                                     
 124. See Schor & Restuccia, supra note 108 (quoting multiple representatives 
summarization of their meeting with Exxon representatives).  
 125. Barrett & Philips, supra note 104. 
 126. See John Schwartz, Exxon Mobil Accuses the Rockefellers of a Climate 
Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/science/exxon-mobil-rockefellers-climate-
change.html (last visited February 9, 2017) (reporting on the back-and-forth 
accusations between Exxon and the alleged groups conspiring against them) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 127. See id. (quoting one Rockefeller descendant as acknowledging the 
“obvious historical irony”).  
 128. See id. (pointing out that Rockefeller funds also provide support to other 
organizations that have been critical of Exxon, such as Greenpeace).  
 129. See id. (“Breitbart News has called the investigation of Exxon a ‘RICO 
conspiracy,’ using the acronym for the federal racketeering law, and the industry-
oriented site Natural Gas Now published an article declaring, ‘It’s time to RICO 
the Rockefellers.’”). 
 130. See Barrett & Philips, supra note 104 (listing the Environmental Defense 
Fund, Sierra Club, and Natural Resources Defense Council as some of the 
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DeSaulnier approached the Securities and Exchange Commission 
that same day, requesting a fraud probe against Exxon.131 It 
became apparent that the tide against ExxonMobil was only rising, 
when on November 4, 2015, New York Attorney General Eric 
Schneiderman initiated an investigation to determine whether 
Exxon Mobil had lied to the public or investors about the risks of 
climate change.132 Relying on the Martin Act, Schneiderman 
issued a subpoena demanding extensive internal financial records, 
emails, and other documents from a period spanning nearly four 
decades.133 
C. The Convergence of Tobacco Litigation Strategy, the Martin 
Act, and ExxonMobil 
The use of the Martin Act to investigate a company in the 
energy industry was not a novel or overly contentious endeavor 
given past investigations under Andrew Cuomo.134 What was 
novel, and ultimately gave rise to the storm of controversy that 
merits this Note’s discussion, were the events that unfolded in the 
months following Schneiderman’s investigation. On March 29, 
2016, Attorney General Eric Schneiderman convened a press 
conference to announce the formation of an “unprecedented 
                                                                                                     
organizations that signed onto the letter). 
 131. See id. (noting that as of the writing of the article, that probe request was 
still pending, and that Attorney General Lynch had since requested the FBI to 
examine whether the federal government should initiate an investigation).  
 132. See Justin Gillis & Clifford Krauss, Exxon Mobil Investigated for Possible 
Climate Change Lies by New York Attorney General, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/science/new-york-climate-change-inquiry-
into-exxon-adds-prosecutors.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (reporting that the 
investigation is focused on statements the company made to investors about 
climate risks) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 133. See Timothy Cama, Exxon Reveals Subpoena in New York Climate 
Change Case, THE HILL (Oct. 24, 2016, 10:50 AM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/302463-exxon-reveals-subpoena-in-
new-york-climate-change-case (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (noting some of the 
documents demanded are related to research conducted by Exxon regarding the 
causes and effects of global warming) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 134. See supra notes 45–56 and accompanying text (discussing former 
Attorney General Andrew Cuomo’s investigations into energy companies under 
the Martin Act). 
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coalition” of top state law enforcement officials.135 The coalition, 
comprised of seventeen Attorneys General and former Vice 
President Al Gore, vowed to use its collective arsenal of 
investigatory tools to aggressively defend and further build upon 
the progress made by President Obama in combatting climate 
change.136 This press conference signaled the “coming out party” 
for a growing number of state attorneys general who had joined 
Schneiderman in initiating investigations aimed at ExxonMobil, 
claiming that the company may have misled the public and 
investors about its own knowledge of climate change dangers.137  
The announcement came at the end of a daylong event 
Schneiderman organized to educate his fellow attorneys general on 
his investigation into Exxon.138 As the comments from the other 
attorneys general at the press conference showed, Exxon was 
certainly on their minds in making the announcement. 
Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healy, who issued her 
own subpoena to Exxon shortly after, remarked that “fossil fuel 
companies that deceived investors and consumers about the 
dangers of climate change should be—must be—held 
accountable.”139 “We can all see the troubling disconnect,” she 
                                                                                                     
 135. A.G. Schneiderman, Former Vice President Al Gore and a Coalition of 
Attorneys General from Across the Country Announce Historic State-Based Effort 
to Combat Climate Change, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. (Mar. 29, 
2016), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-former-vice-
president-al-gore-and-coalition-attorneys-general-across (last visited Mar. 3, 
2017) [hereinafter Schneiderman Announcement] (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 136. See id. (quoting former Vice President Al Gore as declaring “Attorney 
General and law enforcement officials around the country have long held a vital 
role in ensuring that the progress we have made to solve the climate crisis is not 
only protect, but advanced”).  
 137. John Schwartz, Exxon Mobil Climate Change Inquiry in New York Gains 
Allies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/science/new-york-climate-change-inquiry-
into-exxon-adds-prosecutors.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) [hereinafter 
Schwartz, Climate Change Inquiry Gains Allies] (reporting that attorneys general 
from Vermont, Maryland, Massachusetts, Virginia, Connecticut and the Virgin 
Islands attended) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 138. See Wade, infra note 159 (covering the events of the meeting and 
referencing a statement by the New York Attorney General’s Office that the office 
routinely collaborates with other states and receives input from outside 
organizations). 
 139. Jeff Jacoby, Healey’s Exxon Investigation Runs Into the Bill of Rights, 
BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 11, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion 
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continued, “between what Exxon knew, what industry folks knew, 
and what the company and industry chose to share with the 
investors and with the American public.”140 The statements of 
Schneiderman, Gore, and many of the other attorneys general 
present echoed these sentiments.141 Notably, Al Gore went as far 
as analogizing the coalition to the actions taken against tobacco 
companies in the late 1990s.142 
With the announcements by Massachusetts and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands that they would join New York and California143 
with parallel investigations into internal documents, Exxon’s 
belief that a conspiracy was forming against them largely felt 
confirmed.144 Expectedly, Exxon and its supporters publicly 
rebuked the validity of the investigations.145 The critic’s rationales 
were sweeping—ranging from allegations of a politically-
                                                                                                     
/editorials/2016/12/11/healey-exxon-investigation-runs-into-bill-rights/ 
2bUcNHtZjvbssO7YZIxFkJ/story.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Schneiderman Announcement, supra note 135 (quoting U.S. Virgin 
Islands Attorney General Earl Walker as saying “If Exxon Mobil has tried to cloud 
[the public’s] judgement, we are determined to hold the company accountable”).  
 142. See Schwartz, Climate Change Inquiry Gains Allies, supra note 137 
(noting that Gore emphasized how crucial state attorneys general had been to 
that effort).  
 143. California Attorney General Kamala Harris had launched her own probe 
into ExxonMobil in January, prior to the New York press conference. See Ivan 
Penn, California to Investigate Whether Exxon Mobil Lied About Climate Change 
Risks, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-
fi-exxon-global-warming-20160120-story.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) 
(reporting that U.S. Representative for California Ted Lieu praised the move) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 144. See Barrett & Philips, supra note 104 (“Exxon executives say their view 
of #ExxonKnew as a conspiracy was confirmed by the gathering of 15 state 
attorneys general and Gore in New York on March 29.”). 
 145. See Katie Brown, Greens’ Attempt to Tie Big Tobacco with American Oil: 
An Absurd Apples-and-Snickers Bars Comparison, ENERGY IN DEPTH (June 22, 
2016, 12:12 PM), https://energyindepth.org/national/greens-attempt-to-tie-big-
tobacco-with-american-oil-an-absurd-apples-and-snickers-bars-comparison/ (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2017) (sampling the criticisms leveled at the attorneys general and 
the validity of their investigations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review) 
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motivated conspiracy146 to improper use of subpoena power147—
and even violation of the first amendment.148 Some legal scholars 
expressed skepticism about the legal strategy of the attorneys 
general, such as Vermont Law School professor Pat Parenteau’s 
remark that “[t]he most serious question is whether the attorney 
general has any basis to suspect that Exxon has engaged in 
activities that violate that statues about obtaining money by false 
pretense and fraud.”149 Additionally, Columbia Law School 
                                                                                                     
 146. See Marita Noon, May Free Speech Reign and Scientific Inquiry Prevail, 
HEARTLAND INST. (July, 6, 2016), http://blog.heartland.org/2016/07/may-free-
speech-reign-and-scientific-inquiry-prevail/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (remarking 
that “climate change activists have been secretly coordinating with one another 
to prosecute individuals, organizations, and companies that are their ideological 
foes,” and that this coordination includes working with  state attorneys general) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 147. See Philip Hamburger, A Climate Courtroom Crusade Scorches Due 
Process, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2016, 7:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-
climate-courtroom-crusade-scorches-due-process-1463007726 (last visited Mar. 3, 
2017) (criticizing attorneys’ general subpoena power as combining grand-jury and 
prosecutorial functions, allowing attorneys general like Eric Schneiderman to 
“engage in roving investigations” that threaten “liberty and due process”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 148. See Michael A. Carvin & Yaakov M. Roth, Op-Ed: AG’s Subpoenas Over 
Climate Change Flout Constitution, NAT’L L. J. (Dec. 31, 2015), 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202746113687/OpEd-AGs-Subpoenas-
over-Climate-Change-Flout-Constitution?slreturn=20170121204804 (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2017) (arguing that the First Amendment protects actors who seek to 
exercise their right to take positions in active policy debates and prevents the 
government from punishing speech it disagrees with) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). But see John B. Williams, Peter J. Fontaine and Catherine 
Reilly, Rebuttal: AG’s Pursuit of Oil Giants is Legally Sound, NAT’L L. J. (Jan. 25, 
2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202747714889/Rebuttal-AGs-
Pursuit-of-Oil-Giants-Is-Legally-Sound (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (responding to 
the previous Op-Ed by arguing that the investigation does not target “falsity 
alone, but also whether ExxonMobil made deliberately false or misleading 
statements and/or omissions in order to mislead investors regarding the business 
impact of climate change”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 149. See Bob Simison & David Hasemyer, Exxon Fights Subpoena in 
Widening Climate Probe, Citing Violation of Its Constitutional Rights, 
INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (Apr. 14, 2016), 
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/13042016/exxon-virgin-islands-subpoena-
climate-change-investigation-violates-rights-claude-walker (last visited Mar. 3, 
2017) (referring to the investigation commissioned by U.S. Virgin Islands 
attorney general Claude Walker) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); see also Lincoln Caplan, Will the “Tobacco Strategy” Work Against Big 
Oil?, NEW YORKER (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/will-the-tobacco-strategy-work-against-big-oil (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (“Is 
the ‘tobacco strategy’ the way to try to document that ExxonMobil fraudulently 
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Professor Merritt B. Fox questioned whether the information 
sought by the investigations would have been material enough to 
investors to find that ExxonMobil’s public statements were 
misleading under the Martin Act, given the market was “well 
supplied with information about climate change.”150 In a later-
published opinion piece, Professor Fox criticized Eric 
Schneiderman’s subpoena as an abuse of his Martin Act powers, 
considering the disconnect from possible securities violations and 
the likely motive of seeking corporate documents for public policy 
reasons.151 
While Exxon and its supporters were voicing their 
disapproval, other Exxon-backers immediately went on the 
offensive.152 Specifically, the Energy & Environmental Legal 
Institute (E&E Legal),153 which has been described as “an anti-
environmentalist research machine,”154 obtained internal email 
correspondence between the offices of the attorneys general 
present at the New York conference.155 The emails revealed that 
                                                                                                     
deceived the public about climate change and hold the giant energy company 
accountable? It is a promising but hugely expensive and grueling model.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 150. See Securities Disclosures and Climate Change in View of Peabody and 
ExxonMobil (panel discussion), COLUM. L. SCH. SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 
L. (May 25, 2016), http://www.kaltura.com/index.php/ 
extwidget/preview/partner_id/1758691/uiconf_id/33931461/entry_id/0_xr29aj21/
embed/auto?&flashvars[streamerType]=auto (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (raising 
suspicion over why Eric Schneiderman would pursue a case “so unlikely” to “be a 
winner” during his remarks at a panel discussion) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 151. See Merritt B. Fox, Exxon Mobil is Being Investigated, but Here’s the Real 
Problem, NAT’L L. J. (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/ 
id=1202765027711/Exxon-Mobil-is-Being-Investigated-But-Heres-the-Real-
Problem?slreturn=20160820150633 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (positing that it’s 
unlikely that the subpoena will turn up information that could plausibly support 
an argument that ExxonMobil violated the Martin Act) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 152. See Schor & Restuccia, supra note 108 (listing examples of individuals 
and groups that went on the offensive in support of Exxon). 
 153. See Who We Are, E&E LEGAL, https://eelegal.org/who-we-are/ (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2017) (describing the group’s mission as seeking to “address and correct 
erroneous federal and state government actions that negatively impact energy 
and the environment”). 
 154. Schor & Restuccia, supra note 108.  
 155. See Christopher C. Horner, Email Bombshell: Attorneys General Worked 
with Green Groups to Punish Political Opponents, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. 
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the New York conference included two undisclosed 
presentations.156 The first presentation, on “the imperative of 
taking action now against climate change,” was led by Peter 
Frumhoff, director of science and policy for the Union of Concerned 
Scientists, the same organization that published early reports on 
Exxon’s alleged use of Big Tobacco tactics to create scientific 
uncertainty, as well as organized the 2012 La Jolla Conference.157 
“Climate change litigation” was the subject of the second 
presentation, conducted by Matthew Pawa of Pawa Law Group, 
P.C., who previously presented at the 2012 La Jolla Conference.158 
Additionally, the  emailed revealed that the attorneys general had 
proposed the possibility of using RICO if Exxon was found to have 
misled the public, as well as inviting former tobacco litigator 
Sharon Eubanks to the conference.159 Given the connection to the 
                                                                                                     
(Apr. 18, 2016), https://cei.org/content/email-bombshell-attorneys-general-
worked-green-groups-punish-political-opponents (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) 
(indicating the emails were obtained via an open records law request to the 
Vermont state Attorney General’s office) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 156. See id. (referring to an agenda contained in one of the obtained emails, 
which scheduled forty-five minute windows for each presentation).  
 157. Id.; see also supra notes 105–116 and accompanying text (discussing the 
organization and goals of the 2012 La Jolla Conference). 
 158. Id.; see also supra notes 105–116 and accompanying text (focusing on the 
Conference’s findings regarding tobacco litigation tactics and the potential to port 
such tactics to other fields).  
 159. See Terry Wade, U.S. State Prosecutors Met With Climate Groups as 
Exxon Probes Expanded, REUTERS (Apr. 15, 2016, 7:21 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-exxonmobil-states-idUSKCN0XC2U2 (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2017) (summarizing the contents of the obtained emails) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The emails also included a “Common 
Interest Agreement,” in which the signatories agreed to maintain confidentiality 
and protect as privilege the discussions during the conference. See Horner supra 
note 155 (criticizing the agreement as a sign the attorneys general sought to hide 
their coordination). Critics attached the agreement as a sign that the attorneys 
general sought to hide their discussions, a criticism bolstered by an email 
exchange in which a member of Eric Schneiderman’s staff requested that Mr. 
Pawa not confirm his attendance at the event if asked. See Katie Brown, New 
Emails Reveal Attorneys General Signed Agreement to Keep #ExxonKnew Strategy 
Documents Secret, ENERGY IN DEPTH (July 6, 2016, 4:04 PM), 
https://energyindepth.org/national/new-emails-reveal-attorneys-general-signed-
agreement-to-keep-exxonknew-strategy-documents-secret/ (last visited Mar. 3, 
2017) (quoting Schneiderman’s staff member’s response to Mr. Pawa, asking that 
“if you speaker to the reporter, [do] not confirm that you attended or otherwise 
discuss the event”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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La Jolla Conference, which had focused on assessing strategies for 
legal action against the fossil fuel industry—including tactics to 
obtain internal documents developed during tobacco litigation—
allegations of collusion and misconduct abounded.160  
Despite efforts to beat back these allegations and criticism,161 
Attorney General Schneiderman and his coalition soon found 
themselves face-to-face with Exxon’s response.162 On April 13, 
2016, ExxonMobil filed suit in Texas seeking to block the U.S. 
Virgin Island’s subpoena on the grounds that it was an politically 
motivated fishing expedition, which violated constitutional 
amendments on free speech, unreasonable search and seizure, and 
equal protection.163 Another suit followed in June, this time 
                                                                                                     
 160. See Margaret A. (Peggy) Little, The Climate Change Inquisition, Part 
II—the Scandal Unfolds, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.fed-
soc.org/blog/detail/the-climate-change-inquisition-part-iithe-scandal-unfolds 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (criticizing the attorneys general alleged collusion as 
being commissioned in bad faith, outside of their powers, and in violation of the 
Constitution) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Rich 
Lowry, Eric Schneiderman and His Gang of AGs are Trampling the First 
Amendment, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 19, 2016 12:00 AM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/434219/exxon-climate-change-case-
outrageous (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (condemning the attorneys general for 
flaunting their political motives and harassing Exxon’s first amendment rights) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 161. See John Schwartz, Exxon Mobil Fraud Inquiry Said to Focus More on 
Future Than Past, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/20/science/exxon-mobil-fraud-inquiry-said-to-
focus-more-on-future-than-past.html?_r=0 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) 
(interviewing Eric Schneiderman, who rebukes accusations that he is abusing his 
prosecutorial powers for political ends) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 162. See Amy Harder, Devlin Barrett, & Bradley Olson, Exxon Fires Back in 
Court Over U.S.’s Climate Probe, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2016, 3:08 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/exxon-fires-back-at-climate-change-probe-
1460574535 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (reporting on Exxon’s first challenge to the 
state attorneys’ general investigations—filing in federal court to block the 
subpoena issued by the attorney general of the U.S. Virgin Islands) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 163. See id. (citing arguments put forth in the complaint that the subpoena 
was issued based on an ulterior motive). ExxonMobil’s complaint alleged seven 
causes of action: conspiracy, violation of the company’s First, Fourth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment Rights, violation of the company’s rights under the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, federal preemption, and abuse of process.  See First 
Amended Complaint, infra note 165, at 41–47 (seeking a declaratory judgment 
that the subpoenas violate the causes of action alleged, and a permanent 
injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the subpoenas).  
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against Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey, and was 
later amended that fall to include New York Attorney General Eric 
Schneiderman.164 Citing the same claims of constitutional 
violations as the U.S. Virgin Islands suit, the complaint 
emphasized that the investigations were “an unlawful exercise of 
government power to further political objectives.”165 As these 
events unfolded in the courts, a Congressional response emerged 
in July, when the House Science, Space and Technology Committee 
issued subpoenas to the New York and Massachusetts attorneys 
general and eight environmental organizations.166 Led by 
Republican Chairman Lamar Smith of Texas, the committee 
sought documents related to whether the attorneys’ general 
investigations were the product of a coordinated strategy 
encouraged by environmental groups.167  
Ultimately, Attorney General Walker caved to the mounting 
opposition, withdrawing the U.S. Virgin Island’s subpoena in 
July.168 Healey and Schneiderman, however, have steadfastly 
                                                                                                     
 164. See David Hasemyer, 2016: Exxon vs. Climate Change, a Battle with 
Many Fronts, INSIDECLIMATE NEWS (Dec. 28, 2016), 
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/23122016/exxon-climate-change-
investigation-attorneys-general (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (noting that 
ExxonMobil had been complying with New York’s investigation up to the time of 
filing, already producing over 1.2 million pages of documents) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 165. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 5, 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey, No. 4:16-CV-469-K (N.D. Tex. 2016), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3217539/New-York-Sued-11-10.pdf 
[hereinafter First Amended Complaint]. See also ExxonMobil Asks Federal Court 
to Invalidate New York Attorney General’s Subpoena, EXXONMOBIL (Oct. 17, 2016, 
10:51 AM), http://news.exxonmobil.com/press-release/exxonmobil-asks-federal-
court-invalidate-new-york-attorney-generals-subpoena (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) 
(notifying the public through a press release that evidence of the attorneys’ 
general collaboration with activists shows a lack of impartial investigating) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 166. See Steve Mufson, Republicans Just Escalated the War Over ExxonMobil 
and Climate Change, WASH. POST (July 13, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/07/13/ 
republicans-just-escalated-the-war-over-exxonmobil-and-climate-change/?utm_ 
term=.9a88f54b991e (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (reporting the outcries from 
environmental groups over the committee’s subpoenas) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 167. See id. (quoting committee member Darin LaHood, “[p]rosecutors 
shouldn’t be in this business . . . . It really is an abuse of power”). 
 168. See Noon, supra note 146 (reporting on Attorney General Walker’s 
decision to withdraw his subpoena, and quoiting ExxonMobil supporters who cite 
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defended their acts and refused to cooperate with the 
Representative Smith’s investigation.169 Additionally, both Healey 
and Schneiderman have filed motions to dismiss in the 
ExxonMobil lawsuit, but neither have been ruled on as of this 
Note’s publication.170 
In light of the backlash over Schneiderman’s investigation, 
this Note recognizes that the perceived reemergence of tobacco 
tactics, bolstered by use of the Martin Act, has struck a nerve in 
the debate regarding increasing activism by state attorneys 
general. And that if these actions are deemed to have crossed the 
boundaries of acceptable use of attorney general powers, then 
significant consequences may exist.    
IV. Potential Consequences of Pushing the Boundaries of Attorney 
General Activism  
The question remains as to what are the possible consequences 
if these investigations are found to be beyond the boundaries of 
attorney general powers, and whether in the face of these 
consequences, Eric Schneiderman should reevaluate the direction 
of the investigation going forward. Given the uncertainty 
regarding the outcomes of the court proceedings and 
investigations, the assessment of these consequences is largely 
hypothetical.171 This, however, does not detract from the 
importance of assessing what could follow from attempts to curb 
perceived attorneys general overreach. The relevance of this 
question is highlighted by attorneys general confirming their 
intent to continue being active agents for change,172 and opponents 
                                                                                                     
this decision as a sign these investigations are groundless).  
 169. See Hasemyer, supra note 164 (providing a broad timeline of the multiple 
investigations and lawsuits that unfolded over 2016).  
 170. See David Hasemyer, Exxon Ramps Up Free Speech Argument in 
Fighting Climate Fraud Investigations, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Jan. 13, 2018), 
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/13012018/exxon-climate-change-investor-
fraud-investigations-lawsuit-free-speech-new-york (last visited Mar. 27, 2018) 
(summarizing the most recent procedural history of the ExxonMobil lawsuit) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 171. Infra note 220 and accompanying text.  
 172. See Vivian Yee, To Combat Trump, Democrats Ready a G.O.P. Tactic: 
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/12/14/nyregion/donald-trump-democrats-lawsuits.html (last visited Mar. 3, 
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making clear their interest in curtailing attorneys’ general ability 
to do so.173 
It should first be noted that from a strictly legal standpoint, 
Schneiderman’s opponents have essentially no basis to challenge 
his conduct as improper under the Martin Act. As discussed above, 
the Martin Act equips the attorney general with wide investigative 
latitude.174 The broad definition of fraud that New York state and 
federal courts endorse, coupled with the ability to commence an 
investigation without proof of fraudulent conduct, essentially 
provides a blank check to the attorney general to investigate any 
perceived threat to the public interest.175 In the words of one court, 
the Martin Act should “be liberally and sympathetically construed 
in order that its beneficent purpose may, so far as possible, be 
attained.”176 In the face of this sweeping mandate, it is unlikely 
that any attempt to challenge an investigation as improper under 
the Martin Act would survive.177 That is not to say, however, that 
there are not alternative avenues to check the Schneiderman’s 
conduct, as there are conceivable prudential-type checks.178 
                                                                                                     
2017) (reporting that state attorneys general, including Eric Schneiderman, “have 
vowed to use their power to check and balance Mr. Trump’s Washington”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 173. See Charlie Gasparino & Brian Schwartz, Trump Administration Looks 
to Neuter NYS ‘Martin Act’, FOX BUS. (Nov. 15, 2016), 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2016/11/15/trump-administration-looks-to-
neuter-nys-martin-act.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (pointing to discussions by 
now-President Donald Trump’s transition team member Paul Atkins about ways 
to preempt state securities laws with new legislation) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 174. See supra notes 20–37 and accompanying text (discussing the broad 
investigatory powers of the attorney general under the Martin Act).  
 175. See, e.g., Bishop v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1557 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (endorsing a broad interpretation of fraud under the Martin Act 
as including all deceitful practices contrary to the plain rules of common honesty); 
People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N.Y. 33 (1926) (interpreting fraudulent 
conduct to include all acts with the tendency to deceive or mislead, even if not 
intended to be fraudulent by design).  
 176. People v. F.H. Smith Co., 243 N.Y.S. 446, 449 (N.Y. App. Div. 1930).  
 177. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (explaining that attorney 
general investigative discretion is protected from review by the office’s plenary 
power as the state’s sole law enforcement officer).  
 178. See Infra Part IV.A–B (discussing possible approaches that opponents of 
Eric Schneiderman could take to limit his power without having to overcome the 
broad grant of authority under the Martin Act).  
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Specifically, federal preemption of the Martin Act and the potential 
shift to heightened scrutiny of attorney general investigative 
motive, could potentially reign in attorney general conduct.179 
A. Martin Act Preemption 
To begin, the unorthodox use of the Martin Act in concert with 
tobacco litigation tactics could reignite the debate over whether the 
Act is, or should be, preempted by federal securities law.180 In the 
wake of the Martin Act’s resurgence under Elliott Spitzer, critics 
of his perceived activism raised concerns about the overlapping 
functions of the SEC and state Blue Sky laws like the Martin 
Act.181 Writing in the New York Times, then-chairman of the 
House Committee on Financial Services Michael Oxley remarked:  
What we are witnessing is nothing less than a regulatory coup 
that would usurp the proper role of the S.E.C. and the self-
regulatory organizations. This could result in disastrous 
balkanization of oversight, meaning that every Wall Street firm 
would have to cut its private deal with every state attorney 
general or face the potential threat of fraud charges.182 
                                                                                                     
 179. Infra Part IV.A–B. 
 180. “[T]he term ‘preemption’ refers to the displacement of state law by 
federal states (or by courts seeking to fill gaps in federal states).” Caleb Nelson, 
Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, n.3 (2000). 
 181. See Robert A. McTamaney, New York’s Martin Act: Expanding 
Enforcement in an Era of Federal Securities Regulation, 18 WASH. LEGAL FOUND. 
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Feb., 2003, at 4 (noting that Congressman Michael Oxley 
and then-Chairman of the SEC both had advocated for reigning in state activism 
in securities regulation), http://www.wlf.org/upload/022803LBMctamaney.pdf. 
 182. Michael Oxley, Who Should Police The Financial Markets, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 9, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/09/business/l-who-should-police-
the-financial-markets-447650.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Representative Oxley was the co-author of the 
landmark anti-corporate fraud Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, designed to restore 
confidence in U.S. markets following the historic bankruptcies of Enron and 
WorldCom. See Michael G. Oxley: In Memoriam, BAKER HOSTETLER, 
https://www.bakerlaw.com/michaelgoxley (last visited Mar. 3, 2017), (“[Sarbanes-
Oxley], increased accountability and transparency in financial reporting, 
strengthened corporate boards and governance, and created a new accounting 
oversight board for public companies.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
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Echoing these concerns over “balkanization,” Congress went so far 
to propose an amendment to the Securities Fraud Deterrence and 
Investor Restitution Act of 2003183 that would have preempted 
state enforcement of disclosure requirements and “other yet-
unknown fraudulent practices.”184 The so-called “anti-Spitzer 
amendment” was ultimately dropped from the bill, but its proposal 
is evidence of the climate of concern surrounding state attorney 
general activism through Blue Sky laws.185 Ultimately, the fervor 
over Spitzer’s investigations fizzled, and the breadth of the Martin 
Act continued to grow.186  
With the Martin Act in the spotlight once again, and pundits 
raising concerns for its scope and role, it is not inconceivable that 
the conversation about preemption may return. Federal 
preemption of state law can occur in three ways: express, field, and 
conflict.187 “Express” preemption occurs when a federal law 
includes language explicitly revoking specific powers from the 
states.188 If the Court determines that a federal statute was 
intended to cover an entire “field,” or is so broad that the “field” is 
covered, then it state power may be “field” preempted.189 Lastly, 
“conflict” preemption arises when the Court finds that a state law 
“actually conflicts” with the federal law.190  
                                                                                                     
 183. Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor Restitution Act of 2003, H.R. 
2179, 108th Cong. (as introduced and referred to the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
May 21, 2003). 
 184. See Jonathan Mathiesen, Dr. Spitzlove or: How I Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Love “Balkanization”, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 311, 325 
(explaining that the amendment would have added “disclosure” and “conflict of 
interest” to the catalog of state requirements preempted by the National 
Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996).  
 185. See id. at 326 (describing further proposals of legislative preemption 
from legal academia). 
 186. See supra notes 45–56 and accompanying text (covering previous New 
York Attorney General Elliott Spitzer’s novel and expansive use of the Martin Act 
after it had laid dormant for years). 
 187. See Nelson, supra note 180, at 226 (noting that this is the general 
framework laid out by the United States Supreme Court). 
 188. See id. at 226–227 (describing the two-step framework the court uses to 
assess an express preclusion provision). 
 189. See id. at 227 (“The Court has indicated that a federal regulatory scheme 
may be ‘so pervasive’ as to imply ‘that Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it.”). 
 190. See id. at 228 (stating that a conflict exists if compliance with both the 
state and federal laws would be “physically impossible” or if the state law would 
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The outrage over the Schneiderman investigations could push 
multiple actors to challenge the Martin Act as preempted. The 
most pertinent example is the Trump Administration, which has 
adopted a stern stance of deregulation, especially in the securities 
and financial sector.191 In the days following the election, one 
report emerged that Paul Atkins, a member of the Trump 
transition team, was considering “ways to ensure that federal 
securities laws preempt state [Blue Sky] laws,” like the Martin Act, 
by devising “legislation that would supersede them with existing 
federal statutes.”192 While there has been no further comment on 
this proposal in the early days of the administration, this report 
alone was enough to elicit a fervent response from supporters of 
state regulation, including Eric Schneiderman, who warned “any 
attempt to gut these consumer and investor protections would 
severely undercut state policy powers and only embolden those 
who seek to defraud and exploit everyday Americans.”193 
Additionally, some commentators have noted that an attempt to 
preempt Blue Sky laws could be politically treacherous because of 
risks of filibuster and negative publicity.194 
                                                                                                     
be an obstacle to accomplishing the full purpose of the federal law).  
 191. See Sarah N. Lynch, Trump’s SEC Pick Clayton Points to Capital 
Formation, Not Enforcement, REUTERS (Jan. 5, 2017, 3:52 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-sec-idUSKBN14N1Y9 (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2017) (pointing to Donald Trump’s selection of Walter “Jay” Clayton to 
head the SEC as a sign that the agency will focus on reducing regulations that 
critics cite as burdensome on corporate growth) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 192. See Gasparino & Schwartz, supra note 173 (reporting that Atkins, a 
former SEC commissioner, has “long advocated against state officials over-
stepping their authority through such statutes”). 
 193. See Statement by A.G. Schneiderman on Reports that the Presidential 
Transition Team is Considering Ways to Dismantle State Consumer and Investor 
Protection Statues, also Known as Blue Sky Laws, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE 
ATTORNEY GEN. (Nov. 17, 2016), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/statement-ag-
schneiderman-reports-presidential-transition-team-considering-ways (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Schneiderman Response to Trump] (“At a time 
of regulatory uncertainty at the federal level, it is essential that we maintain that 
very laws that have helped state and local law enforcement keep consumers and 
investors safe for over one hundred years.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 194. See Gasparino & Schwartz, supra note 173 (quoting Columbia Law 
School professor John Coffee, who also noted that “many Republicans believe in 
state regulation”).  
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While the feasibility of a move to expressly preempt the 
Martin Act is beyond to scope of this Note, it should be noted that 
critics have previously argued that, in fact, the Martin Act is 
already preempted by federal law.195 Arising out of the 
“Anti-Spitzer” sentiment of the early 2000s, one commentator 
posited that federal legislation had established a comprehensive 
regime that provided a solution to all manners of securities 
regulation.196 Against this all-pervasive regime, the Martin Act 
adversely affected the SEC’s ability to regulate comprehensively 
and with uniformity as instructed by Congress.197 Thus, the Martin 
Act would not survive under any theory of preemption, with the 
exception of the “fraud” savings clause in the National Securities 
Markets Improvements Act of 1996 (NSMIA).198 Under this 
savings clause, states retained “jurisdiction . . . to investigation 
and . . . enforcement actions with respect to fraud and deceit, or 
unlawful conduction by a broker or dealer, in connection with 
securities and securities transactions.”199 Although no  case 
emerged to test this theory, the commentator later argued that 
even under the NSMIA savings clause, the “fraud” left to the states 
to continue to regulate was “fraud” as defined by the federal 
                                                                                                     
 195. See McTamaney, New York’s Martin Act, supra note 181, at 4 
(speculating on why the Martin Act has not already been found to be preempted 
by the federal securities regime); see also Mathiesen, supra note 184, at 334–50 
(arguing that the SEC possess the authority to administratively preempt the 
Martin Act).  
 196. See Robert A. McTamaney, The Assured Guaranty Case & New York’s 
Martin Act: Pre-Emption Delayed is Justice Denied, 29 WASH. LEGAL FOUND. 
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Mar., 2011, at 1 (pointing to the Securities Act of 1933, 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, National Markets Improvement 
Act of 1996, Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 as comprising the all-pervasive federal scheme), 
http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/03-25-
2011McTamaney_LegalBackgrounder.pdf.  
 197. See McTamaney, New York’s Martin Act, supra note 181, at 4 (predicting 
that a case would come forward to test this theory, especially given Elliott 
Spitzer’s expanded use of the Martin Act at the time). 
 198. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-290, §102(c)(1), 110 Stat. 3419–20 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §77r (2012)); see also 
McTamaney, New York’s Martin Act, supra note 181, at 3 (arguing that this 
savings clause served as a back door for Martin Act enforcement, despite belief 
that the NSMIA stripped Blue Sky laws of most of their power). 
 199 National Securities Markets Improvement Act §102(c)(1), 110 Stat. at 
3419–20. 
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government.200 Because definition of fraud under the Martin Act is 
far broader than the federal requirements—for instance omitting 
the need for scienter—it follows that the Martin Act would fail to 
meet the standard of fraud that the savings clause exception 
preserved.201 Additionally, another observer has theorized that the 
SEC has the authority to “administratively preempt” the Blue Sky 
laws, even in light of the NSMIA savings clause.202 
Although the theories proposed above have not been explicitly 
proven, they make a reasonable case that preemption of the Martin 
Act remains a possibility.203 Considering the fervent criticism of 
Eric Schneiderman’s actions, combined with the deregulatory 
stance of the Trump administration, this possibility of preemption 
becomes a discernable consequence that could result from action 
taken to restrict attorney’s general activism.204 For New York, 
preemption of the Martin Act would strip the attorney general of a 
valuable tool that places a significant role in policing securities 
fraud, especially given the role securities play in the state 
economy.205 Furthermore, preemption of Blue Sky laws nationwide 
may have broader damaging effects, as empirical data has 
suggested that concurrent state-federal enforcement of securities 
fraud laws has some positive externalities which have the 
potential to outweigh opposing costs.206 Thus, the risk of Martin 
                                                                                                     
 200. See McTamaney, The Assured Guaranty Case, supra note 196, at 2–3 (“If 
[Congress] had intended to hand the states a blank check to regulate whatever 
conduct the states wished to pursue, Congress, however unlikely, would have 
simply said so.”). 
 201. See id. at 2 (asserting that if each state could define the breadth of the 
NSMIA savings clause, then the “balkanized” regulation that preceded the 
NSMIA would continue).  
 202. See Mathiesen, supra note 184, at 340–47 (examining the process by 
which an agency may preempt a state law and noting citing examples of the 
Supreme Court acknowledging an agency’s ability to do so).  
 203. See supra notes 196–201 and accompanying text (reviewing arguments 
that the Martin Act is essentially already preempted, and that a single test case 
is needed to prove it).  
 204. See supra notes 191–193 and accompanying text (looking into the 
potential that the Trump administration may attempt to gut the Martin Act, and 
the concerned response of Eric Schneiderman).  
 205. See Schneiderman Response to Trump, supra note 193 (“In the past few 
years alone, multi-state fraud investigations into Wall Street’s role into the 
collapse of the housing market have recovered over $95 billion in fines, penalties, 
and most important, consumer relief.”). 
 206. See Amanda M. Rose, State Enforcement of National Policy: A Contextual 
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Act preemption is a noteworthy consequence with far-reaching 
effects that could follow from attempts to curb attorneys general 
over-stepping their boundaries. 
B. Increased Scrutiny of Attorney General Investigative Motive in 
Multistate Actions 
 The second potential consequence that could follow in 
response to the ExxonMobil investigation is a push to increase the 
scrutiny of attorneys’ general investigative motive.  The most 
fervent criticisms of Eric Schneiderman and the ExxonMobil 
investigation have centered on the belief that his investigation 
under the Martin Act has an ulterior motive other than policing for 
securities fraud. Indeed, the politically charged public statements, 
perceived similarities to tobacco litigation tactics, and evidence of 
cooperation with activists have all contributed to allegations that 
the investigation was conceived in bad faith.207 This has led to calls 
for reigning in alleged abuse of prosecutorial discretion 
characterized by bad faith intent and improper political bias.208 
But have these calls been answered? 
For one, the House Science, Space and Technology Committee 
(“The Committee”) investigation has specifically targeted the 
attorney’s general investigative motive.209 In a letter sent to Eric 
Schneiderman, the committee raised concerns that the 
investigation constitutes a politically motivated attack on 
                                                                                                     
Approach (with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 97 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1344–
52 (2013) (assessing rough empirical evidence of the costs and benefits of 
concurrent state-federal regulation in the securities context, and advancing the 
possibility that careful reform could help increase the overall efficiency of 
securities fraud enforcement in the U.S.).   
 207. See supra notes 138–144 and accompanying text (sampling the various 
criticism aimed at Eric Schneiderman, including questions of whether he really 
is investigating securities fraud with the Martin Act).  
 208. See supra notes 142–145 and accompanying text (explaining that critics 
and ExxonMobil have pointed to evidence of cooperation amongst attorneys 
general and environmental activists as evidence of an ulterior political motive). 
 209. See Committee Scrutinizes Motives of “Green 20”, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON 
SCI., SPACE, & TECH. (May 18, 2016), https://science.house.gov/news/press-
releases/committee-scrutinizes-motive-green-20 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (“The 
Committee is concerned that these efforts to silence speech are based on political 
theater rather than legal or scientific arguments, and that they run counter to an 
attorney general’s duty . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
SMOKE ’EM IF YOU GOT ’EM 375 
ExxonMobil’s free speech rights.210 Citing the evidence of 
cooperation with environmental activists, the Committee 
questioned “the impartiality and independence of current 
investigations,” warning that coordination with interest groups 
may rise to “an abuse of prosecutorial discretion.”211 Although 
Schneiderman has refused to comply with the investigation thus 
far, Committee Chairman Lamar Smith is not backing down 
either, issuing subpoenas for records pertaining to the attorney’s 
general investigative strategy.212  
Echoing the concerns of both the Committee and critics in the 
media, ExxonMobil’s lawsuit to block Eric Schneiderman’s 
investigation is rife with allegations of an improper motive.213 As 
discussed above, each of ExxonMobil’s foremost alleged causes of 
action—violation of the company’s rights under the First, Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments—point to the same factual 
information that has prompted backlash regarding the 
investigation.214 For instance, the complaint alleges that the 
politically charged public statements made by Schneiderman show 
an improper political bias, violating the company’s Fourteenth 
                                                                                                     
 210. Cf. John Schwartz, Exxon Mobil Fights Back at State Inquiries into 
Climate Change Research, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17/science/exxon-mobil-fights-back-at-state-
inquiries-into-climate-change-research.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (citing a 
letter sent by a coalition of state attorneys general not involved in the “AGs for 
Clean Power” coalition, which called the investigations “a grave mistake” that 
“raises substantial First Amendment concerns”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 211. Letter from House Comm. on Sci., Space, and Tech. to Eric 
Schneiderman, Attorney General of N.Y. (May, 18, 2016), 
https://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/05.
18.16%20SST%20Letter%20to%20NY%20AG.pdf. 
 212. See Phil McKenna, State AGs Rally To Defend NY, Mass. Investigations 
of Exxon From Lamar Smith Subpoenas, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Mar. 1, 2017), 
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/01032017/exxon-climate-investigation-
lamar-smith-state-attorneys-general (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (reporting that 
the Committee has also subpoenaed multiple environmental advocacy 
organizations and the SEC, demanding documents related to any discussions with 
attorneys general regarding ExxonMobil) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 213. See supra notes 161–165 and accompanying text (discussing the lawsuits 
filed by ExxonMobil in response to the multiple investigations commissioned by 
state attorneys general).  
 214. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (elaborating on the facts and 
causes of action alleged in Exxon Mobil’s complain, as well as the relief sought). 
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Amendment due process right to a disinterested prosecutor.215 The 
complaint further argued that purported shifts in the focus of the 
investigation show that the attorney general’s office did not bring 
the investigation in good faith, as Schneiderman was searching for 
a legal theory.216 Thus, because the investigation was brought in 
bad faith, it constitutes “an abusive fishing expedition into 40 
years of ExxonMobil’s records, without any legitimate basis for 
believing that ExxonMobil violated New York Law,” which violates 
the company’s Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.217 While these claims must play out in court 
before their validity can be judged, the allegations of improper 
investigative motive have already struck a nerve with the court.218 
Ruling on a jurisdictional issue before Eric Schneiderman was 
joined in the case, the court ordered discovery of Massachusetts 
Attorney General Maura Healey to investigate the court’s concern 
that her investigation was brought in bad faith.219  
The above examples illustrate the relevance of these concerns 
regarding the investigative motive and intent of the ExxonMobil 
investigations. At this point it is difficult to predict the conclusions 
the Congressional investigation or ExxonMobil lawsuit will 
yield.220 What is less difficult, however, is to imagine the 
                                                                                                     
 215. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 165, at 12–16, 44 (arguing that 
the overt political nature of Schneiderman’s statements show he had already 
made up his mind as to what the end result of the investigation would be). 
 216. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 165, at 30–31 (asserting that 
after ExxonMobil complied with New York’s requests for information about its 
climate change research, the investigation suddenly shifted to focus on 
information about ExxonMobil’s oil reserves, under the theory that these reserves 
had been overstated by not accounting for global climate change efforts). 
 217. First Amended Complaint, supra note 165, at 43–44.  
 218. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey, No. 4:16-CV-469-K, 2016 WL 6091249, 
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2016) (issuing an order and opinion directing that 
jurisdictional discovery be conducted before the court reaches a decision on 
ExxonMobil’s motion for a preliminary injunction or Attorney General Healey’s 
motion to dismiss). 
 219.  See id. at *2 (“The Court finds the allegations about Attorney General 
Healey and the anticipatory nature of Attorney General Healey’s remarks about 
the outcome of the Exxon investigation to be concerning to this court. The 
foregoing allegations about Attorney General Healey, if true, may constitute bad 
faith in issuing [the subpoena] . . . .”). 
 220. See Hasemyer, supra note 164 (reporting on the landscape of the 
ExxonMobil investigations and accompanying proceedings, while acknowledging 
that a long fight is still to come).  
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conclusions that might be reached in the public forum. Since the 
rise of the “activist” attorney general,221 there has been ongoing 
debate over the need to restrain attorney’s general powers.222 This 
includes arguments advocating for greater restrictions on attorney 
general discretion to ensure that investigations are not brought 
with improper intent.223 Concerns with attorney general intent are 
even found in the American Bar Association’s most recent 
standards for prosecutorial investigation, which states that 
prosecutors must not “conduct an investigation for an improper 
motive and thus the prosecutor should not allow personal or 
political considerations to improperly influence decisions 
regarding a criminal investigation.”224 As with the risk of 
preemption, the nature of the ExxonMobil investigation could be 
novel and alarming enough to propel the idea of greater scrutiny 
of investigative intent from discussion to action.225 Whether 
through the court proceedings already in motion, or through a 
legislative response, a push for greater scrutiny of prosecutors is a 
cognizable consequence that could follow from attempts to curb an 
attorneys’ general power.  
But are these consequences enough to deter Schneiderman 
from continuing his investigation? He certainly has the option to 
                                                                                                     
 221. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text (providing a brief 
summary of the early efforts by “activist” attorneys general).  
 222. See DeBow, supra note 17, at 1 (arguing the need for reforms that would 
redefine the role of the state attorney general to curb the use of aggressive 
litigation to shape public policy). But cf. Lynch, supra note 14, at 2000–02 
(minimizing critic’s concerns that multistate litigation violates principles of 
federalism and separation of powers).  
 223. See Ronald A. Cass, Power Failure: Prosecution, Power, and Problems, 
16 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 29, 36 (2015) (“[J]udges might be 
more skeptical of rules that broadly vouchsafe prosecutor’s discretion, whether in 
facilitating inquiries before irreparable damage is done or in assuring more 
searching scrutiny for legal assertions on which prosecutions—frequently in 
connection with regulatory crimes—are based.”). 
 224. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTORIAL INVESTIGATIONS, 
§ 1.2(d), cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba 
/publications/criminal_justice_standards/Pros_Investigations.authcheckdam.pdf. 
These standards are not intended to give rise to a cause of action or be the basis 
for civil liability, but rather to provide professional guidance to prosecutorial 
officials. See id. § 1.01(b) (defining “prosecutor” to include any prosecutor or 
attorney who serves as an attorney in a governmental criminal investigation).  
 225. See Cass, supra note 223, at 36 (advocating a year before the ExxonMobil 
investigation that attorney general investigative intent needs greater scrutiny).  
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claw back his investigation and continue down more traditional 
activist attorney general routes, such as classic multistate 
litigation226 or working in concert with the SEC to seek 
disclosure.227 Yet if recent statements are any indication, 
Schneiderman seems determined to power forward for now.228  
This raises two questions: (1) are these risks not significant enough 
to counsel against moving forward, and (2) do the circumstances of 
this investigation suggest instead that moving forward is the best 
possible outcome?  
V. Framing Eric Schneiderman’s Ideal Path Forward in Light of 
Potential Consequences   
The answers to the above questions are implicit in framing 
Eric Schneiderman’s ideal course of conduct going forward. Despite 
potential risks, the unique circumstances of the ExxonMobil 
investigation—combined with the rapidly changing political 
landscape—indicate that moving forward with the investigation is 
Eric Schneiderman’s ideal course of conduct. To begin, the broader 
question that has carried throughout the discussion of this 
investigation is simply “has Eric Schneiderman gone too far?”229 
While instinctively it may appear the answer is yes, the above 
discussion shows that from a purely legal standpoint, his actions 
are within the powers granted by the Martin Act.230 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                     
 226. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text (providing an overview of 
previously successful multistate litigation efforts led by attorneys general).   
 227. See supra notes 46–56 and accompanying text (explaining early use of 
the Martin Act in the field of energy and how Elliot Spitzer worked in concert 
with the SEC to seek guidance on disclosure). See also Hart, supra note 22 
(advocating for Eric Schneiderman to use the Martin Act as a tool to encourage 
the SEC to continue to update their disclosure requirements to better relate to 
current understandings of climate change).  
 228. See Yee, supra note 172 (citing statements from Eric Schneiderman after 
the election stating that he has already begun meeting with other attorneys 
general about defending Obama’s clean-power plan from any Republican 
challenge).  
 229. See supra notes 146–151 and accompanying text (discussing the varying 
criticisms of the ExxonMobil investigation, including questions of whether it is 
beyond Eric Schneiderman’s authority).  
 230. See supra notes 174–179 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
broad grant of authority in the Martin Act makes it difficult to make any claim 
that an investigation is outside of the attorney general’s discretion).  
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although there are potential consequences for pushing the 
boundaries of Martin Act use, none of these risks are one-hundred 
percent guaranteed to occur.231 Because his conduct is not outright 
improper, and there is no guaranteed consequences for his actions, 
there seems to be little incentive to turn back, especially 
considering how far into the investigation he already is.232 
The rapidly shifting political landscape since the election of 
Donald Trump, especially in the climate context, also counsels 
against turning back. First, Donald Trump’s administration has 
made clear their disdain for regulation, especially in regards to the 
SEC and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).233 This is, of 
course, tied to the Republican Party’s belief in the principles of 
federalism: protecting state sovereignty from encroachments by 
federal regulation.234 This interest in devolving power from the 
federal government back to the states is best exemplified by the 
penchant of Republican state attorneys general to sue the Obama 
administration.235 Thus, as the Trump administration continues to 
                                                                                                     
 231. See supra Part IV.A–B (discussing the potential consequences that could 
come from action taken to curb Eric Schneiderman’s conduct and noting that 
there are drawbacks to each avenue of checking his power).  
 232. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (announcing that Attorney 
General Schneiderman had joined Massachusetts Attorney General Maura 
Healey in filing a countersuit in a Massachusetts federal court seeking to compel 
Exxon to comply with the investigation).  
 233. See Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, White House Eyes Plan to Cut EPA 
Staff by One-Fifth, Eliminating Key Programs, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/03/01/ 
white-house-proposes-cutting-epa-staff-by-one-fifth-eliminating-key-programs/? 
utm_term=.12d57e4d14b7 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (noting that a White House 
plan to cut EPA jobs reflects President Trump’s statements as a candidate that 
he’d like to get rid of the EPA “in almost every form”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 234. See Republican Platform: Preamble, REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMMITTEE, 
https://www.gop.com/platform/preamble/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (“This means 
relieving the burden and expense of punishing government regulations. And this 
means returning to the people and the states the control that belongs to them.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 235. See Terrence Henry, What Does the Texas Attorney General do for Fun? 
“Sue the Obama Administration”, STATE IMPACT (Aug. 15, 2012), 
https://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2012/08/15/what-does-the-texas-attorney-
general-do-for-fun-sue-the-obama-administration/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) 
(quoting then-Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott as stating “[w]hat I really do 
for fun is I go into the office [and] I sue the Obama administration”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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cut back on federal involvement in certain policy issues, the states 
are given more opportunity to regulate in those fields as they 
choose. 
This is especially apparent in the field of climate change, as 
the Trump administration has made clear that this is a non-issue 
to the administration and their intention to wash the federal 
government’s hands of any involvement.236 With the federal 
government potentially stepping back from climate change 
entirely, this leaves a sort-of “vacuum” of policy regulation which, 
by principles of federalism, should be filled by the states.237 Herein 
lies the rub: Because Schneiderman’s actions are not outright 
improper, there is a legitimate argument that policing this policy 
issue falls within his discretion as attorney general. Republican 
pundits may call foul, but the broad powers of the Martin Act and 
the principles of federalism give Schneiderman a backstop to lean 
on in justifying his actions.238 Furthermore, Schneiderman’s 
discretion is not unchecked, as he is an elected official, subject to 
the political process, and may lose power if the people of New York 
reject his decisions.239 
Therefore, if the federal government is going to wash its hands 
of regulating in the field of climate change, the door is open to state 
attorneys general to exercise their discretion police in that field as 
they see fit. In this context, the broad powers of the Martin Act 
make it difficult to affirmatively stamp Eric Schneiderman’s 
actions as outright wrong, and the lack of guaranteed 
consequences leaves little incentive to turn back on the 
investigation. Thus, it is in Eric Schneiderman’s best interest to 
continue his investigation despite these risks.  
                                                                                                     
 236. See Andrea Thompson, Climate and Energy Experts Speak Out on 
Trump’s Views, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.scientific 
american.com/article/climate-and-energy-experts-speak-out-on-trump-s-views/ 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (reporting that Donald Trump has previously referred 
to climate change as a hoax) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 237. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (“[T[he states and the people 
retain authority over all unenumerated powers.”). 
 238. See supra notes 174–179 and accompanying text (noting that without a 
strictly legal means of accusing Schneiderman’s conduct as improper, opponents 
will struggle to make an outright case against such conduct). 
 239. See Lynch, supra note 14, at 2002 (“Today, state attorneys general are 
independent executive officers popularly elected in forty-three states.”). 
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VI. Conclusion 
The ExxonMobil investigation has stretched the boundaries of 
activist attorney general conduct far beyond their previous lines. 
The combination of the Martin Act’s broad grant of powers, with 
the connection to tobacco tactics and the politically charged subject 
matter of climate change, make this a complex and polarizing 
issue. Moreover, the country’s rapidly changing political landscape 
makes it difficult to weigh these issues and consider the proper 
boundaries for an activist attorney general. It remains apparent, 
however, that Eric Schneiderman sees no boundaries, and has no 
intention of backing down in the face of contentions that he has 
gone too far.240 
And why should he? Like his predecessors, Schneiderman has 
pushed the door of the Martin Act, opening it farther than ever 
before. Each time one of his predecessors pushed the door open, 
they stood in the face of the backlash and continued forward, 
stretching the boundaries of activist attorney general conduct to a 
new norm. Sure, Schneiderman’s actions are the most novel and 
extreme use of the Martin Act to date, and they may carry 
consequences for the Martin Act’s future. But no reward comes 
without risk, as Sharon Eubanks once quipped in response to 
questions about the risk of losing RICO; “[i]f you have a statue, you 
should use.”241 Allegations of misconduct may continue over 
Schneiderman’s coordination with activist groups, but even his 
opponent’s hands are not clean, as evidenced by a report that 
former-Oklahoma attorney general and now-Administrator of the 
EPA Scott Pruitt coordinated lawsuits against the EPA with major 
oil and gas producers.242  
                                                                                                     
 240. See A.G. Schneiderman Leads Coalition of 23 AGs in Suit to Block Illegal 
Rollback of Net Neutrality, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. (Feb. 22, 
2018), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-leads-coalition-23-ags-
suit-block-illegal-rollback-net-neutrality (last visited Mar. 27, 2018) (announcing 
the formation of a similar coalition of state attorneys general that jointly filed a 
lawsuit to block the repeal of net neutrality) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 241. SHULMAN, ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 59, at 14.  
 242. See Coral Davenport & Eric Lipton, The Pruitt Emails: E.P.A. Chief was 
Arm in Arm with Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/us/politics/scott-pruitt-environmental-
protection-agency.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2017) (noting that oil and gas 
industry executives held secret meetings with Pruitt to coordinate ways to combat 
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In 2016, the country saw Donald Trump redefine what it 
means to be a political candidate. In 2017, we watched as he 
pushed our definition of what it means to be president. Perhaps 
2018 is the year that Eric Schneiderman pushes our 
understanding of the state attorney general’s role as an agent of 
change. The “activist” attorney general will always be a polarizing 
and controversial figure, but the shifting tides of the United States’ 
political and enforcement regime may lead us to rethink the 
boundaries of their ability to be agents of change.  
                                                                                                     
the Obama administration’s environmental agenda) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
